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Abstract—Automated detection of software vulnerabilities is a fundamental problem in software security. Existing program analysis
techniques either suffer from high false positives or false negatives. Recent progress in Deep Learning (DL) has resulted in a surge of
interest in applying DL for automated vulnerability detection. Several recent studies have demonstrated promising results achieving an
accuracy of up to 95% at detecting vulnerabilities. In this paper, we ask, “how well do the state-of-the-art DL-based techniques perform
in a real-world vulnerability prediction scenario?”. To our surprise, we find that their performance drops by more than 50%. A
systematic investigation of what causes such precipitous performance drop reveals that existing DL-based vulnerability prediction
approaches suffer from challenges with the training data (e.g., data duplication, unrealistic distribution of vulnerable classes, etc.) and
with the model choices (e.g., simple token-based models). As a result, these approaches often do not learn features related to the
actual cause of the vulnerabilities. Instead, they learn unrelated artifacts from the dataset (e.g., specific variable/function names, etc.).
Leveraging these empirical findings, we demonstrate how a more principled approach to data collection and model design, based on
realistic settings of vulnerability prediction, can lead to better solutions. The resulting tools perform significantly better than the studied
baseline—up to 33.57% boost in precision and 128.38% boost in recall compared to the best performing model in the literature.
Overall, this paper elucidates existing DL-based vulnerability prediction systems’ potential issues and draws a roadmap for future
DL-based vulnerability prediction research. In that spirit, we make available all the artifacts supporting our results: https://git.io/Jf6IA.
Index Terms—Software Vulnerability, Deep Learning, Graph Neural Network.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Automated detection of security vulnerabilities is a funda-
mental problem in systems security. Traditional techniques
are known to suffer from high false-positive/false-negative
rates [1]–[5]. For example, static analysis-based tools typi-
cally result in high false positives, i.e., detect non-vulnerable
cases as vulnerable, and dynamic analysis suffers from high
false negatives, i.e., cannot detect many real vulnerabilities.
After prolonged effort, these tools remain unreliable, leaving
significant manual overhead for developers [2].
Recent progress in Deep Learning (DL), especially in
domains like computer vision and natural language pro-
cessing, has sparked interest in using DL to detect security
vulnerabilities automatically with high accuracy. According
to Google scholar, 92 papers appeared in popular security
and software engineering venues between 2019 and 2020
that apply learning techniques to detect different types of
bugs1. In fact, several recent studies have demonstrated very
promising results achieving high accuracy (up to 95%) at
detecting vulnerabilities [6]–[12].
Given such remarkable reported success of DL models
at detecting vulnerabilities, it is natural to ask why they are
performing so well, what kind of features these models are
learning, and most importantly, whether they can be used
effectively and reliably in detecting real-world vulnerabili-
ties. Understanding such explainability and generalizability
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of the DL models is pertinent as it may help solve similar
problems in other domains like computer vision [13], [14].
For instance, the generalizability of a DL model is
limited by implicit biases in the dataset, which are often
introduced during the dataset generation/curation/labeling
process and therefore affect both the testing and training
data equally (assuming that they are drawn from the same
dataset). These biases tend to allow DL models to achieve
high accuracy in the test data by learning highly idiosyn-
cratic features specific to that dataset instead of generaliz-
able features. For example, Yudkowsky et al. [15] described
an instance where US Army found out that a neural network
for detecting camouflaged tanks did not generalize well
due to dataset bias even though the model achieved very
high accuracy in the testing data. They found that all the
photos with the camouflaged tanks in the dataset were shot
in cloudy days, and the model simply learned to classify
lighter and darker images instead of detecting tanks.
In this paper, we systematically measure the generaliz-
ability of four state-of-the-art Deep Learning-based Vulner-
ability Prediction (hereafter DLVP) techniques [6]–[8], [12]
that have been reported to detect security vulnerabilities
with high accuracy (up to 95%) in the existing literature.
We primarily focus on the Deep Neural Network (DNN)
models that take source code as input [6]–[8], [12], [16] and
detect vulnerabilities at function granularity. These models
operate on a wide range of datasets that are either generated
synthetically or adapted from real-world code to fit in
simplified vulnerability prediction settings.
First, we curate a new vulnerability dataset from two
large-scale popular real-world projects (Chromium and De-
bian) to evaluate the performance of existing techniques
in the real-world vulnerability prediction setting. The code
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samples are annotated as vulnerable/non-vulnerable, lever-
aging their issue tracking systems. Since both the code and
annotations come from the real-world, detecting vulnerabil-
ities using such a dataset reflects a realistic vulnerability
prediction scenario. We also use FFMPeg+Qemu dataset
proposed by Zhou et al. [12].
To our surprise, we find that none of the existing models
perform well in real-world settings. If we directly use a
pre-trained model to detect the real-world vulnerabilities,
the performance drops by ∼73%, on average. Even if we
retrain these models with real-world data, their perfor-
mance drops by ∼54% from the reported results. For ex-
ample, VulDeePecker [6] reported a precision of 86.9% in
their paper. However, when we use VulDeePecker’s pre-
trained model in real world datasets, its precision reduced to
11.12%, and after retraining, the precision becomes 17.68%.
A thorough investigation of such poor performance reveals
several problems:
• Inadequate Model. The most popular models are token-
based, which treat code as a sequence of tokens and do
not take into account semantic dependencies that play a
vital role in vulnerability predictions. Even when a graph-
based model is used, it does not focus on increasing the
class-separation between vulnerable and non-vulnerable
categories. Thus, in realistic scenarios, they suffer from low
precision and recall.
• Learning Irrelevant Features. While looking at the features
that the existing techniques are picking up (using state-of-
the-art explanation techniques [17], [18]), we find that the
state-of-the-art models are essentially picking up irrelevant
features that are not related to vulnerabilities and are likely
artifacts of the training datasets.
• Data Duplication. The training and testing data in most
existing approaches contain duplicates (up to 68%); thus,
artificially inflating the reported results.
• Data Imbalance. Existing approaches do not alleviate the
class imbalance problem [19], [20] of real-world vulnera-
bility distribution as non-vulnerable code is much more
frequent than the vulnerable ones.
Having established these concerns empirically, we propose a
road-map that we hope will help the DL-based vulnerability
prediction researchers to avoid such pitfalls in the future. To
this end, we demonstrate how a more principled approach
to data collection and model design, based on our empirical
findings, can lead to better solutions. For data collection, we
discuss how to curate real-world vulnerability prediction
data incorporating both static and evolutionary (i.e., bug-fix)
nature of the vulnerabilities. For model building, we show
representation learning [21] can be used on top of traditional
DL methods to increase the class separation between vul-
nerable and non-vulnerable samples. Representation learn-
ing is a popular class of machine learning techniques that
automatically discovers the input representations needed
for improving classification, and thus, replaces the need for
manual feature engineering. Our key insight is as follows:
distinguishing features of vulnerable and benign code is
complex; thus, the model must learn to represent them
automatically in the feature space.
We further empirically establish that using semantic in-
formation (with graph-based models), data de-duplication,
and balancing training data to address the class imbalance
of vulnerable/non-vulnerable samples can significantly im-
prove vulnerability prediction. Following these steps, we
can boost precision and recall of the best performing model
in the literature by up to 33.57% and 128.38% respectively
over current baselines.
In summary, our contributions in this paper are:
1) We systematically study existing approaches in DLVP
task and identify several problems with the current
dataset and modeling practices.
2) Leveraging the empirical results, we propose a sum-
mary of best practices that can help future DLVP re-
search and experimentally validate these suggestions.
3) We curated a real-world dataset from developer/user
reported vulnerabilities of Chromium and Debian
projects. We release our dataset in this anonymous
directory https://bit.ly/3bX30ai.
4) We also open source all our code and data we used
in this study for broader dissemination. Our code and
replication data are available in https://git.io/Jf6IA.
To this end, we argue that DL-based vulnerability detection
is still very much an open problem and requires a well-
thought-out data collection and model design framework
guided by real-word vulnerability detection settings.
2 BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
DLVP methods aim to detect unknown vulnerabilities in
target software by learning different vulnerability patterns
from a training dataset. Most popular DLVP approaches
consist of three steps: data collection, model building, and
evaluation. First, data is collected for training, and an ap-
propriate model is chosen as per design goal and resource
constraints. The training data is preprocessed according to
the format preferred by the chosen model. Then the model
is trained to minimize a loss function. The trained model
is intended to be used in the real world. To assess the
effectiveness of the model performance of the model is
evaluated on unseen test examples.
This section describes the theory of DL-based vulnerabil-
ity prediction approaches (§2.1), existing datasets (§2.2), ex-
isting modeling techniques (§2.3), and evaluation procedure
(§2.4). Therein, we discuss the challenges that potentially
limit the applicability of existing DLVP techniques.
2.1 DLVP Theory
DL-based vulnerability predictors learn the vulnerable code
patterns from a training data (Dtrain) set where code ele-
ments are labeled as vulnerable or non-vulnerable. Given
a code element (x) and corresponding vulnerable/non-
vulnerable label (y), the goal of the model is to learn features
that maximize the probability p(y|x) with respect to the
model parameters (θ). Formally, training a model is learning
the optimal parameter settings (θ∗) such that,
θ∗ = argmaxθ
∏
(x,y)∈Dtrain
p(y|x, θ) (1)
First, a code element (xi) is transformed to a real valued
vector (hi ∈ Rn), which is a compact representation of xi.
How a model transforms xi to hi depends on the specifics of
the model. This hi is transformed to a scalar yˆ ∈ [0, 1] which
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denotes the probability of code element xi being vulnerable.
In general, this transformation and probability calculation is
achieved through a feed forward layer and a softmax [22]
layer in the model. Typically, for binary classification task
like vulnerability prediction, optimal model parameters are
learned by minimizing the cross-entropy loss [23]. Cross-
entropy loss penalizes the discrepancy in the model’s pre-
dicted probability and the actual probability (0. for non-
vulnerable 1. for vulnerable examples) [24].
Synthetic Semi
Synthetic
Real
(Balanced)
Pattern
B
ased
Static
A
nalyzer
D
eveloper
Provided
Realistic	nature	of	Code
Source	of		A
nnotation
SATE	IV
Juliet	
SARD,
NVD
FFMpeg
+Qemu
Draper
REVEAL
Dataset
Real
(Imbalanced)
FF peg+
Qemu
Figure 1: Different DLVP dataset and their synthetic/realistic
nature. From red to green, colors symbolize increasing realistic
nature of dataset. Red is the most synthetic, green is the most
realistic.
2.2 Existing Dataset
To train a vulnerability prediction model, we need a set
of annotated code with labels vulnerable or benign. The
number of vulnerable code should be large enough to allow
the model to learn from it. Researchers used a wide spec-
trum of data sources to collect data for DLVP (see Figure 1).
Depending on how the code samples are collected and how
they are annotated, we classify them as:
• Synthetic data: The vulnerable code example and the an-
notations are artificially created. SATE IV Juliet [25] dataset
and SARD [26] fall in this category. Here the examples
are synthesized using known vulnerable patterns. These
datasets were originally designed for evaluating traditional
static and dynamic analysis based vulnerability prediction
tools.
• Semi-synthetic data: Here either the code or the annotation
is derived artificially. For example, Draper dataset, proposed
by Russell et al. [8], contains functions that are collected
from open source repositories but are annotated using static
analyzers. Examples of SARD [26] and National Vulnera-
bility Database (NVD [27]) dataset are also taken from
production code; however, they are often modified in a way
to demonstrate the vulnerability isolating them from their
original context. Although these datasets are more complex
than synthetic ones, they do not fully capture the complex-
ities of the real-world vulnerabilities due to simplifications
and isolations.
• Real data: Here both the code and the corresponding vul-
nerability annotations are derived from real-world sources.
For instance, Zhou et al. [12] curated Devign dataset, which
consists of past vulnerabilities and their fixes from four
open-source projects, two of which are publicly available.
1 void action(char *data) const {
2 // FLAW: Increment of pointer in the loop will cause
3 // freeing of memory not at the start of the buffer.
4 for (; *data != ’\0’; data++){
5 if (*data == SEARCH_CHAR){
6 printLine("We have a match!");
7 break;
8 }
9 }
10 free(data);
11 }
Figure 2: Example Vulnerability (CWE761) [28].
1 static void eap_request(
2 eap_state *esp, u_char *inp, int id, int len) {
3 ...
4 if (vallen < 8 || vallen > len) {
5 ...
6 break;
7 }
8 /* FLAW: ’rhostname’ array is vulnerable to overflow.*/
9 - if (vallen >= len + sizeof (rhostname)){
10 + if (len - vallen >= (int)sizeof (rhostname)){
11 ppp_dbglog(...);
12 MEMCPY(rhostname, inp + vallen,
sizeof(rhostname) - 1);
13 rhostname[sizeof(rhostname) - 1] = ’\0’;
14 ...
15 }
16 ...
17 }
Figure 3: CVE-2020-8597 - A partial patch (original patch [29])
for an instance of buffer overflow vulnerability in linux point to
point protocol daemon (pppd) due to a logic flaw in the packet
processor [30], [31].
Limitations. The problems with the dataset lie in how
realistic the data source is and how they are annotated
(see Figure 1). A model trained on a synthetic dataset
comprising of simple patterns will be limited to detecting
only those simple pattern which seldom occur in real life.
For instance, consider an atypical buffer overflow example
in Figure 2 used by VulDeePecker and SySeVR. Albeit a
good pedagogical example, real world vulnerabilities are
not as simple or as isolated. Figure 3 shows another buffer
overflow example from linux kernel. Though the fix is very
simple, finding the vulnerability itself requires an in-depth
reasoning about the semantics of different components (i.e.,
variables, functions etc.) of the code. A model is trained to
reason about simpler examples as in Figure 2 will fail to
reason about Figure 3 code. Further, any model annotated
by a static analyzer [8] inherits all the drawbacks, e.g.,, high
false positive rate [1], [2]. In the most realistic dataset, FFM-
Peg+Qemu [12], the ratio of vulnerable and non-vulnerable
examples is approximately 45%-55%, which does not reflect
the real world distribution of vulnerable code. Further,
the dataset only contains function that annotates functions
that went through vulnerability-fix commits as vulnerable.
When a model is trained on such dataset, the model is not
presented with other functions from a vulnerable functions’
context, thus will not be as effective in differentiating vul-
nerable functions from other non-vulnerable functions from
the context.
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2.3 Existing Modeling Approaches
Model selection depends primarily on the information that
one wants to incorporate. The popular choices for DLVP
are token-based or graph-based models, and the input data
(code) is preprocessed accordingly [6], [8], [12].
• Token-based models: In the token-based models, code is
considered as a sequence of tokens. Existing token-based
models used different Neural Network architectures. For
instance, Li et al. [6] proposed a Bidirectional Long Short
Term Memory (BSLTM) based model, Russell et al. [8] pro-
posed a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Radom
Forest-based model and compared against Recurrent Neu-
ral Network (RNN) and CNN based baseline models for
vulnerability prediction. For these relatively simple token-
based models, token sequence length is an important factor
to impact performance as it is difficult for the models
to reason about long sequences. To address this problem,
VulDeePecker [6] and SySeVR [7] extract code slices. The
motivation behind slicing is that not every line in the code
is equally important for vulnerability prediction. Therefore,
instead of considering the whole code, only slices extracted
from “interesting points” in code (e.g., API calls, array in-
dexing, pointer usage, etc.) are considered for vulnerability
prediction and rest are omitted.
• Graph-based models: These models consider code as graphs
and incorporate different syntactic and semantic depen-
dencies. Different type of syntactic graph (Abstract Syntax
Tree) and semantic graph (Control Flow graph, Data Flow
graph, Program Dependency graph, Def-Use chain graph
etc.) can be used for vulnerability prediction. For example,
Devign [12] leverage code property graph (CPG) proposed
by Yamaguchi et al. [16] to build their graph based vulnera-
bility prediction model. CPG is constructed by augmenting
different dependency edges (i.e., control flow, data flow, def-
use, etc.) to the code’s Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) (see §4 for
details).
Both graph and token-based models have to deal with
vocabulary explosion problem—the number of possible iden-
tifiers (variable, function name, constants) in code can be
virtually infinite, and the models have to reason about
such identifiers. A common way to address this issue is to
replace the tokens with abstract names [6], [7]. For instance,
VulDeePecker [6] replaces most of the variable and func-
tion names with symbolic names (VAR1, VAR2, FUNC1,
FUNC2 etc.).
Expected input for all the models are real valued vec-
tors commonly known as embeddings. There are several
ways to embed tokens to vectors. One such way is to use
an embedding layer [32] that is jointly trained with the
vulnerability prediction task [8]. Another option is to use
external word embedding tool(e.g., Word2Vec [33]) to create
vector representation of every token. VulDeePecker [6] and
SySeVR [7] uses Word2Vec to transform their symbolic to-
kens into vectors. Devign [12], in contrast, uses Word2Vec to
transform the concrete code tokens to real vectors.
Once a model is chosen and appropriate preprocessing
is done on the training dataset, the model is ready to be
trained by minimizing a loss function. Most of the existing
approaches optimize the model by minimizing some varia-
tion of cross-entropy loss. For instance, Russell et al. [8] opti-
mized their model using cross-entropy loss, Zhou et al. [12]
used regularized cross entropy loss.
1
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void	action(char	*data)	const	{
				for	(;	*data	!=	'\0';	data++){
								foo(data);
								bar(data);
								if	(*data	==	SEARCH_CHAR){
												printLine("We	have	a	match!");
												break;
								}
				}
				free(data);
}
Figure 4: Example of CWE-761 [34]. A buffer is freed not at the
start of the buffer but somewhere in the middle of the buffer.
This can cause the application to crash, or in some cases, modify
critical program variables or execute code. This vulnerability
can be detected with data dependency.
Limitations. Token based models assume that tokens
are linearly dependent on each other, and thus, only
lexical dependencies between the tokens are present, while
the semantic dependencies are lost, which often play
important roles in vulnerability prediction [35]–[37]. To
incorporate some semantic information, VulDeePecker [6]
and SySeVR [7] extracted program slices of a potentially
interesting point. For example, consider the code in
Figure 4. A slice w.r.t.free function call at line 10 gives us
all the lines except lines 6 and 7. The token sequence of
the slice are: void action ( char * data ) const
{ for ( data ; * data != ‘\0’ ; data ++ ) {
foo ( data ) ; bar ( data ) ; if ( * data ==
SEARCH_CHAR ) { free ( data ) ;. In this examples,
while the two main components for this code being
vulnerable, i.e. data ++ (line 2) and free ( data )
(line 10) are present in the token sequence, they are far
apart from each other without explicitly maintaining any
dependencies.
In contrast, as a graph based model can consider the
data dependency edges (red edge), we see that there is a
direct edge between those lines making those lines closer to
each other making it easier for the model to reason about
that connection. Note that this is a simple CWE example
(CWE 761), which requires only the data dependency graph
to reason about. Real-world vulnerabilities are much more
complex and require reasoning about control flow, data flow,
dominance relationship, and other kinds of dependencies
between code elements [16]. However, graph-based models,
in general, are much more expensive than their token-
based counterparts and do not perform well in a resource-
constrained environment.
One problem with the existing approaches is that al-
though the trained models learn to discriminate vulnerable
and non-vulnerable code samples, the training paradigm
does not explicitly focus on increasing the separation be-
tween the vulnerable and non-vulnerable examples. Thus,
with slight variations the classifications become brittle.
Another problem pertains to data imbalance [38] be-
tween vulnerable and benign code as the proportion of
vulnerable examples in comparison to the non-vulnerable
one in real world dataset is extremely low [8]. When a model
is trained on such imbalanced dataset, models tend to be
biased by the non-vulnerable examples.
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def spam() {
  ...
}
def spam() {
  ...
}
def ham_1() {
  ...
  ...
}
def egg() {
  ...
}
def egg() {
  ...
}
Fixed
Unchanged
Unchanged
func.c  (version k-1) func.c  (version k)
def ham_0() {
  ...
  ...
}
Figure 5: Collecting real world data for REVEAL. Green sam-
ples are labeled as non-vulnerable, while red sample is marked
as vulnerable.
2.4 Existing Evaluation Approaches
To understand the applicability of a trained model for
detecting vulnerability in the real-world, it must first be
evaluated. In most cases, a trained model is evaluated on
held out test set. Test examples go through the same pre-
processing technique as the training and then the model
predicts the vulnerability of those pre-processed test exam-
ples. This evaluation approach gives an estimate of how the
model may perform when used to detect vulnerabilities in
the real-world.
Limitations. Although all the existing approaches report
their performances using their own evaluation dataset, it
does not give a comprehensive overview of the applicability
of the model in the real-world. All we can learn from
such intra-dataset evaluation is how well their approach
fits their own dataset. Although there are some limited
case studies on such models finding vulnerabilities in real-
world projects, those case studies do not shed light on
the false positives and false negatives [1]. The number of
false positives and false negatives are directly correlated
to the developer effort in vulnerability prediction [39] and
too much of any would hold the developer from using the
model [40], [41].
3 REVEAL DATA COLLECTION
To address the limitations with the existing data sets, we
curate a more robust and comprehensive real world dataset,
REVEAL, by tracking the past vulnerabilities from two
open-source projects: Linux Debian Kernel and Chromium
(open source project of Chrome). We select these projects
because: (i) these are two popular and well-maintained
public projects with large evolutionary history, (ii) the two
projects represent two important program domains (OS and
browsers) that exhibit diverse security issues, and (iii) both
the projects have plenty of publicly available vulnerability
reports.
To curate our data, we first collect already fixed issues
with publicly available patches. For Chromium, we scraped
its bug repository Bugzilla2. For Linux Debian Kernel, we
collected the issues from Debian security tracker3. We then
identify vulnerability related issues, i.e., we choose those
patches that are labeled with “security”. This identification
2. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list
3. https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/
mechanism is inspired by the security issue identification
techniques proposed by Zhou et al. [42], where they filter
out commits that do not have security related keywords.
For each patch, we extracted the corresponding vulnera-
ble and fixed versions (i.e., old and new version) of C/C++
source and header files that are changed in the patch. We
annotate the previous versions of all changed functions (i.e.,
the versions prior to the patch) as vulnerable and the fixed
version of all the changed functions (i.e., the version after
patch) as ‘clean’. Additionally, other functions that were not
involved in the patch (i.e., those that remained unchanged)
are all annotated as ‘clean’.
A contrived example of our data collection strategy is
illustrated in Figure 5. Here, we have two versions of a file
file.c. The previous version of the file (version k − 1)
has a vulnerability which is fixed in the subsequent version
(version k) by patching the function ham_0() to ham_1().
In our dataset, ham_0() would be included and labeled
‘vulnerable’ and ham_1() would be included and labeled
‘clean’. The other two functions (spam() and egg) re-
mained unchanged in the patch. Our dataset would include
a copy of these two functions and label them as ‘clean’.
Annotating code in this way simulates real-world vul-
nerability prediction scenario, where a DL model would
learn to inspect the vulnerable function in the context of
all the other functions in its scope. Further, by retaining
the fixed variant of the vulnerable function, the DL model
may learn the nature of patch. We make available our data
collection framework and the curated vulnerability data for
Chromium and Debian4 for broader dissemination.
4 REVEAL PIPELINE
In this section, we present a brief overview of the REVEAL
pipeline that aims to more accurately detect the presence of
real-world vulnerabilities. Figure 6 illustrates the REVEAL
pipeline. It operates in two phases namely, feature extrac-
tion (Phase-I) and training (Phase-II). In the first phase we
translate real-world code into a graph-embedding (§4.1). In
the second phase, we train a representation learner on the
extracted features to learn a representation that most ideally
demarcates the vulnerable examples from non-vulnerable
examples (§4.2). Algorithm 1 shows the full training proce-
dure for REVEAL. This algorithm expects Training data –
a list of tuples, where each tuple contains a code (C) and
corresponding vulnerability annotation (l).
4.1 Feature Extraction (Phase-I)
The goal of this phase is to convert code into a compact
and a uniform length feature vector while maintaining the
semantic and syntactic information. Note that, the feature
extraction scheme presented below represents the most
commonly used series of steps for extracting features from
a graph representation [12]. REVEAL uses Algorithm 2 to
extract graph embedding (graph based feature vector that
represent the entirety of a function in a code).
To extract the syntax and semantics in the code, we
generate a code property graph (hereafter, CPG) [16]. The
CPG is a particularly useful representation of the original
4. Chromium and Debian dataset: https://bit.ly/3bX30ai
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Table 1: Summary of DLVP datasets and approaches.
Dataset Used By # Programs % Vul* Granularity Model Type Model Description
SATE IV Juliet [25] Russell et al. [8] 11,896 45.00 Function Token CNN+RF Synthetic code for testing static analyzers.
SARD [26] VulDeePecker [6] 9,851 31 Slice Token BLSTM Synthetic, academic, and production security
flaws or vulnerabilities.SySeVR [7] 14,000 13.41 Slice Token BGRU
NVD [27] VulDeePecker
‡ 840 31 Slice Token BLSTM Collection of known vulnerabilities
from real world projects.SySeVR‡ 1,592 13.41 Slice Token BGRU
Draper [8] Russell et al. [8] 1,274,366 6.46 Function Token CNN+RF
Contains code from public repositories
in Github and Debian source repositories.
FFMPeg+Qemu [12] Devign [12] 22,361 45.02 Function Graph GGNN
FFMPeg is a multimedia library;
Qemu is hardware virtualization emulator.
REVEAL dataset This paper 18,169 9.16 Function Graph
GGNN +
MLP +
Triplet Loss
Contains code from Chromium and Debian
source code repository
* Percentage of vulnerable samples in the dataset.
‡ VulDeePecker and SySeVR uses combination of SARD and NVD datasets to train and evaluate their model.
Training
Samples
Testing
Samples
Code Property
Graph
Node Feature
Extraction
GRU
GGNN Node
Embedding
Embedded
Training
Embedded
Testing
Resampling
Detection
Phase
Representation
Learning
Phase I: Feature Extraction Phase II: Training
Graph
Embedding
∑
!
GRU
GRU
GRU
Figure 6: Overview of the REVEAL vulnerability prediction framework.
code since it offers a combined and a succinct representation
of the code consisting of elements from the control-flow
and data-flow graph in addition to the AST and program
dependency graph (or PDG). Each of the above elements
offer additional context about the overall semantic structure
of the code [16].
Formally, a CPG is denoted as G = (V,E), where
V represent the vertices (or nodes) in the graph and E
represents the edges. Each vertex V in the CPG is com-
prised of the vertex type (e.g., ArithmeticExpression,
CallStatement etc.) and a fragment of the original code.
To encode the type information, we use a one-hot encoding
vector denoted by Tv . To encode the code fragment in the
vertex, we use a word2vec embedding denoted by Cv . Next,
to create the vertex embedding, we concatenate Tv and Cv
into a joint vector notation for each vertex.
The current vertex embedding is not adequate since it
considers each vertex in isolation. It therefore lacks informa-
tion about its adjacent vertices and, as a result, the overall
graph structure. This may be addressed by ensuring that
each vertex embedding reflects both its information and
those of its neighbors. We use gated graph neural networks
(hereafter GGNN) [43] for this purpose.
Feature vectors for all the nodes in the graph (X) along
with the edges (E) are the input to the GGNN [42], [43]. For
every vertex in the CPG, GGNN assigns a gated recurring
unit (GRU) that updates the current vertex embedding by
assimilating the embedding of all its neighbors. Formally,
x′v = GRU(xv,
∑
(u,v)∈E
g(xu))
Where, GRU(·) is a Gated Recurrent Function, xv is the
embedding of the current vertex v, and g(·) is a transfor-
mation function that assimilates the embeddings of all of
vertex v’s neighbors [43]–[45]. x′v is the GGNN-transformed
representation of the vertex v’s original embedding xv . x′v
now incorporates v’s original embedding xv as well as the
embedding of its neighbors.
The final step in preprocessing is to aggregate all the
vertex embedding x′v to create a single vector representing
the whole CPG denoted by xg , i.e.:
xg =
∑
v∈V
x′v
Note that REVEAL uses a simple element-wise sum-
mation as the aggregation function, but in practice it is
a configurable parameter in the pipeline. The result of
the pipeline presented so far is an m−dimensional feature
vector representation of the original source code. To pre-
train the GGNN, we augment a classification layer on top
of the GGNN feature extraction. This training mechanism
is similar to Devign [12]. Such pre-training deconstructs
the task of “learning code representation”, and “learning
vulnerability”, and is also used by Russell et al. [8]. While,
we pre-train GGNN in a supervised fashion, unsupervised
program representation learning [46] can also be done to
learn better program presentation. However, such learning
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Algorithm 1: REVEAL.
Input : Train data – Dtrain,
Contribution of triplet loss – α,
Contribution of regularization loss – β,
Separation boundary – γ,
Learning rate – lr
Output: Trained model.
1 Function REVEAL:
2 features ← ∅
3 labels ← ∅
4 . Extract features from every code
5 for (C, l) ∈ Dtrain do
6 f ← embed features(C)
7 features ← features ∪ f
8 labels ← labels ∪ l
9 end
10 . Rebalance with SMOTE.
11 Dbalanced ←SMOTE(features, labels)
12 M← RepresentationLearningModel()
13 . Train Model.
14 for (xg , lxg ) ∈ Dbalanced do
15 . Define loss function.
16 Lall ← loss function(M, Dbalanced, xg , lxg , α, β, γ)
17 . θ represents the model parameters of M.
18 θ ← θ −∇θ(Lall)
19 end
20 returnMθ
Algorithm 2: Graph Embedding
Input : Code – C.
Output: Feature vector xg representing C.
1 Function embed_features(C):
2 (V,E)← extract code property graph (C)
3 X← ∅
4 for v ∈ V do
5 Tv ← onehot(v.type())
6 Cv ← word2vec(v.code fragment())
7 xv ← concat(Tv , Cv)
8 X← xv ∪X
9 end
10 X′ ← GGNN(X,E)
11 xg ← Aggregate(X′)
12 return xg
is beyond the scope of this research and we leave that for
future research.
4.2 Training (Phase-II)
In real-world data, the number of non-vulnerable samples
(i.e., negative examples) far outnumbers the vulnerable ex-
amples (i.e., positive examples) as shown in Table 1. If
left unaddressed, this introduces an undesirable bias in
the model limiting its predictive performance. Further, ex-
tracted feature vectors of the vulnerable and non-vulnerable
examples exhibit a significant overlap in the feature space.
This makes it difficult to demarcate the vulnerable examples
from the non-vulnerable ones. Training a DL model without
accounting for the overlap makes it susceptible to poor
predictive performance.
To mitigate the above problems, we propose a two step
approach. First, we use re-sampling to balance the ratio
of vulnerable and non-vulnerable examples in the training
data. Next, we train a representation learning model on the
re-balanced data to learn a representation that can most opti-
mally distinguish vulnerable and non-vulnerable examples.
Algorithm 3: Pseudocode for SMOTE.
Input : Training Dataset – Dtrain
Number of Nearest Neighbors – k,
Expected Number of samples per class – m
Output: Sampled Dataset – Dsampled.
1 Function SMOTE(Dtrain, k, m):
2 Dsampled ← Dtrain
3 while # of Majority examples > m do
4 x← random majority class example from Dsampled
5 Remove x from Dsampled
6 end
7 while # of Minority examples < m do
8 x← random minority class example from Dsampled
9 neighbors← k nearest minority neighbors of x
10 for n ∈ neighbors do
11 xs ← interpolate(x, n)
12 Add xs to Dsampled
13 end
14 end
15 return Dsampled
4.2.1 Reducing Class Imbalance
In order to handle imbalance in the number of vulnerable
and non-vulnerable classes, we use the “synthetic minority
over-sampling technique” (for short, SMOTE) [47]. It op-
erates by changing the frequency of the different classes
in the data. Specifically, SMOTE sub-samples the majority
class (i.e., randomly deleting some examples) while super-
sampling the minority class (by creating synthetic examples)
until all classes have the same frequency. In the case of
vulnerability prediction, the minority class is usually the
vulnerable examples. SMOTE has shown to be effective in a
number of domains with imbalanced datasets [48]–[54].
During super-sampling, SMOTE picks a vulnerable ex-
ample and finds k nearest vulnerable neighbors. It then
builds a synthetic member of the minority class by inter-
polating between itself and one of its random nearest neigh-
bors. During under-sampling, SMOTE randomly removes
non-vulnerable examples from the training set. This process
is repeated until a balance is reached between the vulnerable
and non-vulnerable examples. We present the pseudo-code
of SMOTE in Algorithm 3.
4.2.2 Representation Learning Model
The graph embedding of the vulnerable and non-vulnerable
code samples at the end of Phase-I tend to exhibit a high
degree of overlap in feature space. This effect is illustrated
by the t-SNE plot [55] of the feature space in Figure 8(a)–(d).
In these examples, there are no clear distinctions between
the vulnerable (denoted by +) and the non-vulnerable
samples (denoted by ◦). This lack of separation makes it
particularly difficult to train an ML model to learn the
distinction between the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable
samples.
To improve the predictive performance, we seek a model
that can project the features from the original non-separable
space into a latent space which offers a better separability
between vulnerable and non-vulnerable samples. For this,
we use a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) [23], designed to
transform input feature vector (xg) to a latent representation
denoted by h(xg). The MLP consists of three groups of
layers namely, the input layer (xg), a set of intermediate
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layers which are parameterized by θ (denoted by f(·, θ),
and a final output layer denoted by yˆ.
The proposed representation learner works by taking
as input the original graph embedding xg and passing
it through the intermediate layers f(·, θ). The intermedi-
ate layer project the original graph embedding xg onto
a latent space h(xg). Finally, the output layer uses the
features in the latent space to predict for vulnerabilities
as, yˆ = σ (W ∗ h(xg) + b). Where σ represents the softmax
function, hg is the latent representation, W and b represent
the model weights and bias respectively.
To maximize the separation between the vulnerable
and the non-vulnerable examples in the latent space, we
adopt the triplet loss [56] as our loss function. Triplet loss
has been widely used in machine learning, specifically
in representation learning, to create a maximal separation
between classes [57], [58]. The triplet loss is comprised of
three individual loss functions: (a) cross entropy loss (LCE);
(b) projection loss (Lp); and (c) regularization loss (Lreg ). It
is given by:
Ltrp = LCE + α ∗ Lp + β ∗ Lreg (2)
α and β are two hyperparameters indicating the contribu-
tion of projection loss and regularization loss respectively.
The first component of the triplet loss is to measure the
cross-entropy loss to penalize miss-classifications. Cross-
entropy loss increases as the predicted probability diverges
from the actual label. It is given by,
LCE = −
∑
yˆ · log(y) + (1− yˆ) · log(1− y) (3)
Here, y is the true label and yˆ represents the predicted
label.The second component of the triplet loss is used the
quantify how well the latent representation can separate the
vulnerable and non-vulnerable examples. A latent represen-
tation is considered useful if all the vulnerable examples in
the latent space are close to each other while simultaneous
being farther away from all the non-vulnerable examples,
i.e., examples from same class are very close (i.e., similar) to
each other and examples from different class are far away
from each other. Accordingly, we define a loss function Lp
which is defined by.
Lp = |D(h(xg), h(xsame))− D(h(xg), h(xdiff )) + γ| (4)
Here, h(xsame) is the latent representation of an example
that belongs to the same class as xg and h(xdiff ) is the latent
representation of an example that belongs to a different class
as that of xg . Further, γ is a hyperparameter used to define
a minimum separation boundary. Lastly, D(·) represents the
cosine distance between two vectors and is given by,
D(v1, v2) = 1−
∣∣∣∣ v1.v2||v1|| ∗ ||v2||
∣∣∣∣ (5)
If the distance between two examples that belong to the
same class is large (i.e., D(h(xg), h(xsame)) is large) or if
the distance between two examples that belong to different
classes is small (i.e., D(h(xg), h(xdiff )) is small), Lp would
be large to indicate a sub-optimal representation.
The final component of the triplet loss is the regular-
ization loss (Lreg ) that is used to limit the magnitude of
latent representation (h(xg)). It has been observed that,
over several iterations, the latent representation h(xg) of the
input xg tend to increase in magnitude arbitrarily [56], [59].
Algorithm 4: Loss function.
Input : Model – M
Sampled dataset – Dbalanced
Code feature and label of an example – xg , lxg
Training Hyperparameters – α, β, γ, lr
Output: REVEAL loss.
1 Function Loss(M,Dbalanced, xg , lxg , α, β, γ, lr):
2 . Sample for xp and xn from Dbalanced.
3 xp ← x ∈ Dbalanced|(lx = lxg&xp 6= xg)
4 xn ← x ∈ Dbalanced|(lx 6= lxg&xn 6= xg)
5 . Transform xg , xp, xn to latent space.
6 hg , yg ← M.predict(xg)
7 hp ← M.transform(xp)
8 hn ← M.transform(xn)
9 Lce ← cross entropy(yg , lxg )
10 Ldist ← |D(hg , hp)− D(hg , hn) + γ|
11 Lre ← ||h(xg)||+ ||h(xp)||+ ||h(xn)||
12 . Final loss.
13 Lall ← Lce + α ∗ Ldist + β ∗ Lre
14 return Lall
Such arbitrary increase in h(xg) prevents the model from
converging [60], [61]. Therefore, we use a regularization
loss (Lreg ) to penalize latent representations (h(xg)) that are
larger in magnitude. The regularization loss is given by:
Lreg = ||h(xg)||+ ||h(xsame)||+ ||h(xdiff )|| (6)
With the triplet loss function, REVEAL trains the model
to optimize for it parameters (i.e., θ,W, b) by minimizing
equation 2. The effect of using representation learning can
be observed by the better separability of the vulnerable and
non-vulnerable examples in Figure 8(b). Algorithm 4 shows
the detailed algorithm for calculating the loss.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
5.1 Implementation Details
We use Pytorch 1.4.0 with Cuda version 10.1 to implement
our method. For GGNN, we use tensorflow 1.15. We ran
our experiments on single Nvidia Geforce 1080Ti GPU,
Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.60GHz 16 CPU with 252 GB ram. Neither
Devign’s implementation, nor their hyperparameters ate
not publicly availavle. We followed their paper and re-
implemented to our best ability. For the GGNN, maximum
iteration number is set to be 500. For the representation
learner maximum iteration is 100. We stop the training
procedure if F1-score on validation set does not increase
in for 50 consecutive training iteration for GGNN and 5
for Representation Learning. Hyper-parameters for different
components in REVEAL are shown in Table 2.
5.2 Study Subject
Table 1 summarizes all the vulnerability prediction ap-
proaches and datasets studied in this paper. We evaluate the
existing methods (i.e., VulDeePecker [6], SySeVR [7], Rus-
sell et al. [8], and Devign [12]) and REVEAL’s performance
on two real world datasets (i.e., REVEAL dataset, and FFM-
Peg+Qemu). FFMPeg+Qemu was shared by Zhou et al. [12]
who also proposed the Devign model in the same work.
Their implementation of Devign was not publicly available.
We re-implement their method to report our results. We
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Table 2: Hyper-parameter settings of REVEAL.
Model Parameter Value
Word2Vec Window Size 10
Vector Size 100
Input Embedding Size 169
Hidden Size 200
Number of Graph layers 8
Graph Activation Function tanh
GGNN
Learning Rate 0.0001
Number of hidden layers 3
Hidden layers sizes 256, 128, 256
Hidden layer activation functions relu
Dropout Probability 0.2
γ 0.5
α 0.5
β 0.001
Optimizer Adam
Repr-model
lr 0.001
Repr-model = Representation Learning Model used in REVEAL.
ensure that our results closely match their reported results
in identical settings.
5.3 Evaluation
To understand a model’s performance, researchers and
model developers need to understand the performance of
a model against a known set of examples. There are two
important aspect to note here, (a) the evaluation metric, and
(b) the evaluation procedure.
Problem Formulation and Evaluation Metric: Most of the ap-
proaches formulate the problem as a classification problem,
where given a code example, the model will provide a bi-
nary prediction indicating whether the code is vulnerable or
not. This prediction formulation relies on the fact that there
are sufficient number of examples (both vulnerable and non-
vulnerable) to train on. In this study, we are focusing on the
similar formulation. While both VulDeePecker and SySeVR
formulate the problem as classification of code slices, we
followed the problem formulation used by Russell et al. [8],
and Devign [42], where we classify the function. This is the
most suitable model working with the graph, since slices are
paths in the graph.
We study approaches based on four popular evaluation
metrics for classification task [62] – Accuracy, Precision,
Recall, and F1-score. Precision, also known as Positive Pre-
dictive rate, is calculated as true positive / (true positive +
false positive), indicates correctness of predicted vulnerable
samples. Recall, on the other hand, indicates the effective-
ness of vulnerability prediction and is calculated as true
positive / (true positive + false negative). F1-score is defined
as the geometric mean of precision and recall and indicates
balance between those.
Evaluation Procedure: Since DL models highly depend on
the randomness [63], to remove any bias created due to
the randomness, we run 30 trials of the same experiment.
At every run, we randomly split the dataset into disjoint
train, validation, and test sets with 80%, 10%, and 20% of
the dataset respectively. We report the median performance
and the inter-quartile range (IQR) of the performance. When
comparing the results to baselines, we use statistical signifi-
cance test [51], [64], [65] and effect size test [66]. Significance
test tells us whether two series of samples differ merely
by random noises. Effect sizes tells us whether two series
of samples differ by more than just a trivial amount. To
assert statistically sound comparisons, following previous
approaches [67]–[71], we use a non-parametric bootstrap
hypothesis test [72] in conjunction with the A12 effect size
test [73]–[75]. We distinguish results from different experi-
ments if both significance test and effect size test agreed that
the division was statistically significant (99% confidence)
and is not result of a “small” effect (A12 ≥ 60%) (similar
to Agrawal et al. [51]).
6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We present our empirical results as answers to the following
research questions:
• RQ1: How effective are existing approaches for real-world
vulnerability prediction? (§6.1)
• RQ2: What are the limitations of existing approaches?
(§6.2)
• RQ3: How to improve DLVP approaches? (§6.3)
6.1 Effectiveness of existing vulnerability prediction
approaches (RQ1)
Motivation. The goal of any DLVP approaches is to be
able to predict vulnerabilities in the real-world. The datasets
that the existing models are trained on contain simplistic ex-
amples that are representative of real-world vulnerabilities.
Therefore, we ought to, in theory, be able to use these models
to detect vulnerabilities in the real-world.
Approach. There are two possible scenarios under which
these models may be used:
◦ Scenario-A (pre-trained models): We may reuse the existing
pre-trained models as it is to predict real-world vulnera-
bilities. To determine how they perform in such a setting,
we first train the baseline models with their respective
datasets as per Table 1. Next, we use those pre-trained
models to detect vulnerabilities in the real-world (i.e., on
FFMPeg+Qemu, and REVEAL dataset).
◦ Scenario-B (re-trained models): We may rebuild the existing
models first by training them on the real-world datasets,
and then use those models to detect the vulnerabilities.
To assess the performance of baseline approaches in this
setting, we first use one portion of the FFMPeg+Qemu and
REVEAL dataset to train each model. Then, we use those
models to predict for vulnerabilities in the remainder of
the FFMPeg+Qemu and REVEAL. We repeat the process 30
times, each time training and testing on different portions
of the dataset.
Observations. Table 3b tabulates the performance of exist-
ing pre-trained models on predicting vulnerabilities in real-
world data (i.e., Scenario-A). We observe a precipitous drop
in performance when pre-trained models are used for real-
world vulnerability prediction.
For example, In REVEAL dataset, VulDeePecker achieves
an F1-score of only 12 .18% and in FFMPeg+Qemu,
VulDeePecker achieves an F1-score of 14 .27%, while in the
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Table 3: Performance of existing approaches in predicting real
world vulnerability. All the numbers are reported as Median
(IQR) format.
(a) Baseline scores reported by the respective papers. We report
single values since authors do not report Median (IQR).
Dataset Technique Training Acc Prec Recall F1
VulDeePecker NVD/SARD · 86.90 · 85.40
SySeVR NVD/SARD 95.90 82.50 · 85.20
Russell et al. Juliet · · · 84.00B
as
el
in
e
Draper · · · 56.6
Devign FFMPeg+Qemu 72.26 · · 73.26
· = Not Reported.
(b) Scenario-A: Using Existing Pre-trained Models
Dataset Technique Training Acc Prec Recall F1
VulDeePecker NVD/SARD 79.05 11.12 13.64 12.18
(0.25) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47)
SySeVR NVD/SARD 79.48 9.38 15.89 10.37
(0.24) (0.30) (0.63) (0.36)
Russell et al. Juliet 38.11 41.36 6.51 11.24(0.11) (0.38) (0.07) (0.12)
Draper 70.08 49.05 15.61 23.66
(0.14) (0.35) (0.12) (0.24)
R
E
V
E
A
L
da
ta
se
t
Devign FFMPeg+Qemu 66.24 10.74 37.04 16.68(0.14) (0.11) (0.54) (0.17)
VulDeePecker NVD/SARD 52.27 8.51 44.78 14.27
(0.23) (0.22) (0.66) (0.33)
SySeVR NVD/SARD 52.52 10.62 46.69 16.77
(0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.31)
Russell et al.
Juliet 49.84 33.17 45.53 37.65
(0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12)F
FM
pe
g
+
Q
em
u
Draper 53.96 44.00 49.53 46.60
(0.14) (0.17) (0.20) (0.15)
(c) Scenario-B: Using Retrained Models with Real-world Data.
Dataset Input Approach Acc Prec Recall F1
R
E
V
E
A
L
da
ta
se
t
Token Russell et al. 90.98 24.63 10.91 15.24
(0.75) (5.35) (2.47) (2.74)
Slice + VulDeePecker 89.05 17.68 13.87 15.7(0.80) (7.51) (8.53) (6.41)
Token SySeVR 84.22 24.46 40.11 30.25
(2.48) (4.85) (4.71) (2.35)
Graph Devign 88.41 34.61 26.67 29.87
(0.66) (3.24) (6.01) (4.34)
FF
M
pe
g
+
Q
em
u
Token Russell et al. 58.13 54.04 39.50 45.62
(0.88) (2.09) (2.17) (1.33)
Slice + VulDeePecker 53.58 47.36 28.70 35.20(0.61) (1.80) (12.08) (8.82)
Token SySeVR 52.52 48.34 65.96 56.03
(0.81) (1.51) (7.12) (3.20)
Graph Devign† 58.57 53.60 62.73 57.18
(1.03) (3.21) (2.99) (2.58)
† We made several unsuccessful attempts to contact the authors for
Devign’s implementation. Despite our best effort, Devign’s reported
result is not reproducible. We make our implementation of Devign
public at https://github.com/saikat107/Devign for further use.
baseline case (see Table 3a), the F1-score of VulDeePecker
was as high as 85 .4%. Even the sophisticated graph-based
Devign model produced an F1-score of only ∼ 17% and
precision as low as ∼ 10% on REVEAL dataset. Similar
performance drops are observed for all the other baselines.
On average, we observe a 73% drop of F1-score across all
the models in this setting.
Table 4: Percentage of duplicate samples in datasets.
Dataset Pre-processing Technique % of duplicates
Juliet Russell et al. 68.63
NVD + SARD VulDeePecker 67.33
SySeVR 61.99
Draper Russell et al. 6.07 / 2.99
REVEAL dataset
None 0.6
VulDeePecker 25.85
SySeVR 25.56
Russell et al. 8.93
FFMPeg+Qemu
None 0.2
VulDeePecker 19.58
SySeVR 22.10
Russell et al. 20.54
For scenario-B, Table 3c tabulates our findings for re-
trained models. Here, we also observe a significant perfor-
mance drop from the baseline results. In REVEAL dataset,
both Russell et al. and VulDeePecker achieve an F1-score
of roughly 15% (in contrast to their baseline performances
of 85%). SySeVR achieved an F1-score of 30% on REVEAL
dataset. We observed similar trends in other settings, with
an average F1 score drop of 54%.
Result: Existing approaches fail to generalize to real-
world vulnerability prediction. If we directly use a pre-
trained model to detect the real-world vulnerabilities, the
f1-score drops by ∼73%, on average. Even if we retrain
these models with real-world data, their performance
drops by ∼54% from the reported results.
6.2 Key limitations of existing DLVP approaches (RQ2)
Motivation. In RQ1, we showed that existing approaches
are not effective in detecting real-world vulnerabilities. In
this RQ, we investigate the reasons behind their failure.
We find that the baseline methods suffer from a number
of problems, as listed below:
6.2.1 Data Duplication
Preprocessing techniques such as slicing used by VulDeeP-
ecker and SySeVR and tokenization used by Russell et al.
introduce a large number of duplicates in both the training
and testing data. There are several ways duplication can be
introduced by these preprocessing techniques – e.g., same
slice can be extracted from different entry points, different
code can have same tokens due to the abstract tokenization,
etc.
Approach. We apply each preprocessing technique to its re-
spective dataset (see §2) and also to the real-world datasets.
Observations. Table 4 tabulates the number of dupli-
cates introduced by some of the vulnerability prediction
approaches. We observe that the preprocessing technique
of SySeVR and VulDeePecker (i.e., slicing followed by tok-
enization) introduces a significant amount of (> 60%) du-
plicate samples. Further, semi-synthetic datasets like NVD,
SARD, and Juliet (comprised of much simpler code snip-
pets) result in a large number of duplicates. In contrast,
real-world datasets are much more complex and therefore
have far fewer duplicates. In our case, the two real-world
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data contain little to no duplicates prior to preprocessing
(REVEAL dataset had only 0.6%, and FFMPeg+Qemu had
0.2%). After preprocessing, although some duplicates are
introduced (e.g., SySeVR’s preprocessing technique intro-
duces 25.56% duplicates in REVEAL dataset and 22.10%
duplicates in FFMPeg+Qemu), they are much lesser than
baseline datasets. While duplicates created by slicing and
pre-processing techniques do favor vulnerability prediction
in general [7], [76], it seriously undermines the capability of
a DL model to extract patterns. In fact, prevalence of such
duplicates in training set might lead a DL model to learn
irrelevant features. Common examples between train and
test sets hampers fair comparison of different DL models
for vulnerability prediction task.
Ideally, a DL based model should be trained and tested
on a dataset where 100% examples are unique. Duplication
tends to artificially inflate the overall performance of a
method [77], as evidenced by the discrepancy of the baseline
results and results of the pre-trained models in Scenario-A
of RQ1 (see Table 3b).
6.2.2 Data Imbalance
Real world data often contains significantly more non-
vulnerable examples than vulnerable ones. A model trained
on such skewed dataset is susceptible to being considerably
biased toward the majority class.
Approach. We compute percentage on vulnerable samples
w.r.t. total number of samples from different datasets used
in this paper as shown in Table 1.
Observations. We notice that several datasets exhibit a
notable imbalance in the fraction of vulnerable and non-
vulnerable examples; . the percentage vulnerability is some-
times as low as 6%. The ratio of vulnerable and non-
vulnerable examples varies depending on the project and
the data collection strategy employed. Existing methods fail
to adequately address the data imbalance during training.
This causes two problems: (1) When pre-trained models are
used (i.e., Scenario-A in RQ1) to predict vulnerabilities in
the real world, the ratios of vulnerable and non-vulnerable
examples differ significantly in training and testing datasets.
This explains why pretrained models perform poorly (as
seen in Table 3b). (2) When the models are re-trained, they
tend to be biased towards the class with the most examples
(i.e., the majority class). This results in poor recall values
(i.e., they miss a lot of true vulnerabilities) and hence, also
the F1-score (as seen in Table 3c).
6.2.3 Learning Irrelevant Features
In order to choose a good DL model for vulnerability
prediction, it is important to understand what features the
model uses to make its predictions. A good model should
assign greater importance to the vulnerability related code
features.
Approach. To understand what features a model uses for its
prediction, we find the feature importance assigned to the
predicted code by the existing approaches. For token-based
models such as VulDeePecker, SySeVR, and Russell et al.,
we use Lemna to identify feature importance [18]. Lemna
assigns each token in the input with a value ωti , representing
the contribution of that token for prediction. A higher value
of ωti indicates a larger contribution of token towards the
1 link_layer_show(struct ib_port *p,
2 struct port_attribute *unused, char * buf){
3 switch (rdma_port_get_link_layer(
4 p->ibdev, p->port_num)) {
5 case IB_LINK_LAYER_INFINIBAND:
6 return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "InfiniBand");
7 case IB_LINK_LAYER_ETHERNET:
8 return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Ethernet");
9 default:
10 return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", "Unknown");
11 }
12 }
(a) Vulnerable code example in Draper [8] dataset correctly
predicted by Russel et al.’s token-based method.
1 static int mov_read_dvc1(MOVContext *c,
2 AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom) {
3 AVStream *st;
4 uint8_t profile_level;
5 if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
6 return 0;
7 st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
8 if (atom.size >= (1<<28) || atom.size < 7)
9 return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
10 profile_level = avio_r8(pb);
11 if ((profile_level & 0xf0) ! = 0xc0)
12 return 0;
... ...
18 st->codec->extradata_size = atom.size - 7;
19 avio_seek(pb, 6, SEEK_CUR);
20 avio_read(
21 pb, st->codec->extradata,
22 st->codec->extradata_size);
23 return 0;
24 }
(b) Vulnerable example from FFMPeg+Qemu [12] dataset
correctly predicted by graph model. Other method could
not predict the vulnerability in this example.
Figure 7: Contribution of different code component in correct
classification of vulnerability by different model. Red-shaded
code elements are most contributing, Green-shaded are the
least. Red colored code are the source of vulnerabilities.
prediction and vice versa. For graph-based models, such as
Devign, Lemna is not applicable [18]. In this case, we use
the activation value of each vertex in the graph to obtain
the feature importance. The larger the activation, the more
critical the vertex is.
Observations. To visualize the feature importances, we use
a heatmap to highlight the most to least important segments
of the code. Figure 7 shows two examples of correct pre-
dictions. Figure 7a shows an instance where Russell et al.’s
token-based method accurately predicted a vulnerability.
But, the features that were considered most important for
the prediction (lines 2 and 3) are not related to the actual
vulnerability that appears in buggy sprintf lines (lines 6,
8, and 10). We observe similar behavior in other token based
methods.
In contrast, Figure 7b shows an example that was mis-
classified as non-vulnerable by token-based methods, but
graph-based models accurately predict them as vulnerable.
Here we note that the vulnerability is on line 20, and graph-
based models use lines 3, 7, 19 to make the prediction, i.e.
mark the corresponding function as vulnerable. We observe
that each of these lines shares a data dependency with line
20 (through pb and st). Since graph-based models learn
the semantic dependencies between each of the vertices in
the graph through the code property graph, a series of con-
nected vertices, each with high feature importance, causes
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Figure 8: t-SNE plots illustrating the separation between vulnerable (denoted by +) and non-vulnerable (denoted by ◦) example.
Existing methods fail to optimally separate vulnerable and non-vulnerable classes.
the graph-based model to make the accurate prediction.
Token-based models lack the requisite semantic information
and therefore fail to make accurate predictions.
6.2.4 Model Selection: Lack of Class Separation
Existing approaches translate source code into a numeric
feature vector that can be used to train a vulnerability pre-
diction model. The efficacy of the vulnerability prediction
model depends on how separable the feature vectors of the
two classes (i.e., vulnerable examples and non-vulnerable
examples) are. The greater the separability of the classes,
the easier it is for a model to distinguish between them.
Approach. We use t-SNE plots to inspect the separability
of the existing models. t-SNE is a popular dimensionality
reduction technique that is particularly well suited for vi-
sualizing how high-dimensional datasets look in a feature
space [55]. A clear separation in the t-SNE space indicates
that the classes are distinguishable from one another. In
order to numerically quantify the separability of the classes,
we use the centroid distance proposed by Mao et al. [56].
We first find the centroids of each of the two classes.
Next, we compute the euclidean distance between the the
centroids. Models that have larger the euclidean distances
are preferable since they exhibit greater class separation.
Observations. Figure 8 illustrates the t-SNE plots of the
existing approaches. All the existing approaches (Figure 8a–
8d) exhibit a significant degree of overlap in the feature
space between the two classes. This is also reflected by
the relatively low distance between the centroids in each
of the existing methods. Among exiting methods, Devign
(Figure 8d) has the least centroid distance (around 0.0025);
this is much lower than any other existing approach. This
lack of separation explains why Devign, in spite of being
a graph-based model, has poor real-world performance
(see Table 3).
Result: Existing approaches have several limitations:
they (a) introduce data duplication, (b) don’t handle data
imbalance, (c) don’t learn semantic information, (d) lack
class separability. DLVP may be improved by addressing
these limitations.
6.3 How to improve DLVP approaches? (RQ3)
Motivation. In RQ2, we highlighted a number of challenges
that limit the performance of existing DLVP on real-world
datasets. To address these challenges, we offer REVEAL—
a roadmap to help avoid some of the common problems
that current state-of-the-art vulnerability prediction meth-
ods face when exposed to real-world datasets.
Approach. A detailed description of REVEAL is presented
in §4. Briefly, it works as follows: (i) input code fragment is
converted to a feature vector with the help of a code prop-
erty graph and GGNN (§4.1); (ii) the feature vectors are re-
sampled using SMOTE (§4.2.1) that addresses potential data
imbalance; and finally, (iii) a multi layer perceptron based
representation learner is trained to learn a representation of
the feature vectors that maximally separates the positive and
negative classes (§4.2.2). This pipeline offers the following
benefits over the current state-of-the-art:
1) Addressing duplication: REVEAL does not suffer from
data duplication. During pre-processing, input samples are
converted to their corresponding code property graphs
whose vertices are embedded with a GGNN and aggregated
with an aggregation function. This pre-processing approach
tends to create a unique feature for every input samples.
So long as the inputs are not exactly the same, the feature
vector will also not be the same.
2) Addressing data imbalance: REVEAL makes use of synthetic
minority oversampling technique (SMOTE) to re-balance
the distribution of vulnerable and non-vulnerable exam-
ples in the training data. This ensures that the trained
model would be distribution agnostic and, therefore, better
suited for real-world vulnerability prediction where the
distribution of vulnerable and non-vulnerable examples is
unknown.
3) Addressing model choice: REVEAL extracts semantic as well
as syntactic information from the source code using code
property graphs. Using GGNN, each vertex embedding is
updated with the embeddings of all its neighboring ver-
tices. This further increases the semantic richness of the
embeddings. This represents a considerable improvement
to the current token-based and slicing-based models. As
shown in Figure 7b, REVEAL can accurately predict the
vulnerability here.
4) Addressing the lack of separability: As shown in Figure 8a–
8d, the vulnerability class is almost inseparable from the
non-vulnerability class in the feature space. To address this
problem, REVEAL uses a representation learner that auto-
matically learns how to re-balance the input feature vectors
such that the vulnerable and non-vulnerable classes are
maximally separated [21]. This offers significant improve-
ments over the current state-of-the-art as shown in Fig-
ure 8e. Compared to the other approaches of Figure 8a–
8d, REVEAL exhibits the highest separation between the
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Figure 9: Performance spectrum of REVEAL dataset.
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Figure 10: Performance spectrum of FFMPeg+Qemu.
Legends: Vul=VulDeePecker [6], Sys=SySeVR [7], Rus=Russell et al. [8], Dev=Devign [12], Rev=REVEAL.
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Figure 11: Effect of GGNN in REVEAL’s F1 score. The per-
formance increase in both datasets when node information
is propagated to the neighboring node through GGNN. The
effect size is 0.81 (large) for REVEAL dataset and 0.73 for
FFMPeg+Qemu.
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Figure 12: Effect of training data re-balancing in REVEAL’s
performance (F1-score). In both datasets, re-balancing improves
the performance of REVEAL.
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Figure 13: REVEAL’s performance (F1-score) in comparison to
other machine learning models.
vulnerable and non-vulnerable classes (roughly 85× higher
than other GGNN based vulnerability prediction).
We compare performance of REVEAL with existing vulnera-
bility prediction approaches of two real-world datasets, i.e.,
FFMPeg+Qemu and REVEAL data.
Observations. Figures 9 and 10 compare the performance
of REVEAL tool with other approaches. We observe that
REVEAL offers noticeable improvements in all the metrics:
◦ REVEAL dataset: REVEAL performs best in terms of F1-
Table 5: Impact of GGNN in REVEAL’s performance [Median
(IQR)].
Dataset Approach Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score
R
E
V
E
A
L
da
ta
se
t REVEAL 83.69 29.48 57.69 39.09
w/o GGNN (1.60) (2.69) (7.85) (2.30)
REVEAL 84.37 30.91 60.91 41.25
with GGNN (1.73) (2.76) (7.89) (2.28)
FF
M
pe
g+
Q
em
u
REVEAL 53.87 49.60 89.25 63.69
w/o GGNN (2.69) (1.68) (3.78) (0.85)
REVEAL 62.51 56.85 74.61 64.42
with GGNN (0.90) (1.54) (4.31) (1.33)
score and recall. The median recall is 60.91% ( 20.8% more
than that of SySeVR, the next best model) and median F1-
score is 41.25% (11.38% more than SySeVR). This represents
a 51.85% and 36.36% improvement in recall and F1 over
SySeVR respectively. While Devign (another GGNN based
vulnerability prediction) produces a better precision, De-
vign’s median recall 56.21% less than that of REVEAL. This
indicates that, compared to Devign, REVEAL can find larger
number of true-positive vulnerabilities (resulting in a better
recall) at the cost slightly more false-positives (resulting in
a slightly lower precision). Overall, REVEAL’s median F1-
score is 11.38% more than Devign, i.e., a 38.09% improve-
ment.
◦ FFMPeg+Qemu: REVEAL outperforms other approaches
in all performance metrics. REVEAL’s median accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1-scores are 5.01%, 5.19%, 13.11%, and
12.64% higher respectively than the next best approach.
In the rest of this research question, we investigate
contribution of each component of REVEAL. Specifically,
we study what improvements are offered by the use of (a)
Graph neural network (§6.3.1); (b) re-balancing training data
with (§6.3.2); and finally (c) representation learning (§6.3.3).
6.3.1 Contribution of Graph Neural Network
To understand the contribution of GGNN, we create a
variant of REVEAL without GGNN. In this setup, we bypass
the use GGNN and aggregate the initial vertex features to
create the graph features. Further, we create another variant
of REVEAL that uses only GGNN without re-sampling or
representation learning.
Figure 11 shows the F1-scores for the above setup. We
observe that, in both REVEAL dataset and FFMPeg+Qemu,
F1-score increases when we use GGNN in REVEAL’s
pipeline. We observe that the improvements offered by the
use of GGNN is statistically significant (with a p-value of
0.0002 in REVEAL dataset, and 0.001 in FFMPeg+Qemu).
Further, when we perform the A12 effect size [66] with 30
independent experiment runs in each case, we found that
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Table 6: Impact of re-balancing training data in REVEAL’s per-
formance (Median/IQR). FFMPeg+Qemu is almost balanced,
thus further re-balancing do not impact performance that
much. However, in REVEAL dataset, training data re-balancing
improved the performance significantly.
Dataset Approach Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score
R
E
V
E
A
L
da
ta
se
t W/O 90.48 46.23 15.09 22.44
Re-balance (0.93) (11.30) (9.09) (9.56)
With 84.37 30.91 60.91 41.25
Rebalance (1.73) (2.76) (7.89) (2.28)
FF
M
pe
g+
Q
em
u
W/O 62.94 58.86 64.20 61.40
Re-balance (1.40) (2.88) (6.76) (1.91)
With 62.51 56.85 74.61 64.42Re-balance (0.90) (1.54) (4.31) (1.33)
the the effect size is 81% for REVEAL dataset and 73% for
FFMPeg+Qemu. This means that 81% of the times REVEAL
performs better with GGNN than it does without GGNN
in REVEAL dataset and 73% in FFMPeg+Qemu. Both of
those effect sizes are considered large indicating REVEAL
with GGNN’s f1-score distribution is better than REVEAL
without GGNN.
We contend that, since GGNN embeds the neighbors’
information in every vertex, vertices have richer information
about the graph. Thus REVEAL’s classification model have
more information at its disposal to reason about. The result
indicates that when vertices assimilate information from
neighboring vertices, vulnerability prediction performance
increases.
6.3.2 Effect of Training Data Balancing
To understand the contribution of SMOTE, we deploy two
variants of REVEAL one with SMOTE and one without. Note
that, REVEAL uses SMOTE as an off-the shelf data balancing
tool. Choice of which data-balancing tool should be used is
a configurable parameter in REVEAL’s pipeline.
Figure 12 illustrates the effect of using data re-sampling
in REVEAL’s pipeline. We observe that re-balancing training
data improves REVEAL’s performance in general. The more
skewed the dataset, the larger the improvement. In FFM-
Peg+Qemu, non-vulnerable examples populates roughly
55% of the data. There, using SMOTE offers only a 3%
improvement in F1-score (see Figure 12b). However, in
REVEAL dataset, non-vulnerable examples populates 90%
of the data, there we obtain more than 22% improvement
in F1-score compared to not using SMOTE (see Figure 12a).
Without SMOTE, the precision of REVEAL tool improves
and reaches up to 46.23% (see Table 6 in Appendix), highest
achieved precision among all the experimental settings.
However, this setting suffers from low recall due to data
imbalance. Thus, if an user cares more about precision over
recall, SMOTE can be turned off, and vice versa.
6.3.3 Effect of Representation Learning
In order to understand the contribution of representation
learning, we replace representation learning with three
other learners: (a) Random Forest (a popular decision tree
based classifier used by other vulnerability prediction ap-
proaches like Russell et al. [8]); (b) SVM with an RBF
kernel which also attempts to maximize the margin be-
tween vulnerable and non-vulnerable instances [78]; and (c)
Table 7: REVEAL’s performance in comparison to other baseline
models – i.e. Random Forest (RF), Support Vector Machine
(SVM), MLP with NLL Loss (MLP†). REVEAL achieves better
performance that other max margin model (SVM), and RE-
VEAL’s loss function improves the performance with respect
to the MLP†.
Dataset Approach Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score
R
E
V
E
A
L
da
ta
se
t
RF 85.46 24.15 26.58 25.32(0.62) (3.03) (2.08) (2.39)
MLP† 84.81 29.35 47.51 36.42(1.80) (3.51) (4.77) (3.40)
SVM 82.61 29.42 61.20 39.85(0.43) (2.45) (1.86) (2.54)
REVEAL 84.37 30.91 60.91 41.25(1.73) (2.76) (7.89) (2.28)
FF
M
pe
g+
Q
em
u
RF 57.34 53.62 50.90 52.23(0.84) (1.50) (1.23) (1.09)
MLP† 61.43 56.87 63.36 59.93(1.38) (2.04) (4.81) (2.46)
SVM 61.84 57.66 63.26 60.47(0.55) (1.18) (1.55) (0.92)
REVEAL 62.51 56.85 74.61 64.42(0.90) (1.54) (4.31) (1.33)
An off-the-shelf Multi-Layer Perceptron which uses a log-
Likelihood loss [79].
Figure 13 shows the REVEAL’s performance with dif-
ferent classification models. In both REVEAL dataset and
FFMPeg+Qemu, our representation learner with triplet loss
achieves the best performance. REVEAL’s median F1-score
is 62.8%, 13.3%, 3.5% higher than that of RF, MLP, and
SVM baselines respectively in REVEAL dataset. For FFM-
Peg+Qemu improvement in median F1-score is 23.33%,
7.5%, 6.5% over RF, MLP, and SVM respectively.
Max-margin models results in better performance in
classifying vulnerable code in general. REVEAL with the
representation learner performs statistically and signifi-
cantly better than SVM in both REVEAL dataset and FFM-
Peg+Qemu (with p-values < 0.01 and A12 > 0.6). This is
likely because SVM is a shallower than a representation
learning model that propagates losses across several per-
ceptron layers.
Result: The performance of DLVP approaches can be sig-
nificantly improved using the REVEAL pipeline. The use
of GGNN based feature embedding along with SMOTE
and representation learning remedies data-duplication,
data imbalance, and lack of separability. REVEAL pro-
duces improvements of up to 33.57% in precision and
128.38% in recall over state-of-the-art methods.
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Vulnerability Detection in Real World
The usefulness of a source code vulnerability detection tool
depends on its use case scenario. Ideally, in a real-world
scenario, developers would deploy a trained vulnerability
prediction model to identify vulnerable functions from a
codebase. In simple terms, given all the functions in the
code base, developers would want to locate the vulnera-
ble function. As discussed in Section 2, evaluating such a
scenario is paramount in understanding the usefulness of
an approach. Existing approaches show very little to no
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evaluation of how respective approaches perform in such
a real-world scenario. For instance, Devign [12] showed a
simulated real imbalanced evaluation (we refer to Table 3 in
Devign’s original paper). However, for that simulation, they
randomly sampled their version of the test data to contain
10% vulnerable example. Their reported results also show
the drop in performance in real world imbalanced settings.
Nevertheless, we hypothesize that their evaluation method
does not truly reflect how a method will perform in the real
world since the imbalance in their dataset is artificial. In this
study, we propose a method to simulate such an evaluation
scenario. Therefore, we hope such evaluation settings help
drive new research in vulnerability detection.
7.2 Vulnerability Data and Tangled commits
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Figure 14: Histogram of number of changed function in Vul-
nerability fix patches.
Tangled commits have long been studied in software
engineering [80]–[83] and a major setback for software evo-
lution history driven research [84]–[86]. Developers often
combine more than one unrelated or weakly related changes
in code in one commit [84] causing such a commit to be
entanglement of more than one changes. Our collected RE-
VEAL data is also subject to such a threat of containing tan-
gled code changes. Thus, we investigate the characteristics
of number of function changes in vulnerability-fix patches.
Figure 14 shows a histogram of number of functions that are
changed per Vulnerability-fix patches. Most of the patches
change very small number of functions. 80% of the changes
account for 12 or fewer number of function changes.
To validate that the empirical finding in the paper are
not biased by the tangled commits, we created an alternate
version of REVEAL data, where we removed any patch that
changes more than one function from consideration. In that
version of REVEAL data, we find that REVEAL achieves
26.33% f1 score. In contrast, if we do not use representation
learning, REVEAL’s f1 score drops to 22.95%. If we do not
use the data balancing, REVEAL’s performance drops to
13.13%. When we remove GGNN from REVEAL’s pipeline,
f1 score drops to 22.82%. These results corroborates the
importance of GGNN, data balancing and representation
learning in REVEAL’s pipeline irrespective of existence of
tangled code changes.
8 RELATED WORK
There have been a wide array of ML-based vulnerability
prediction research [87]–[91]. Yamaguchi et al. [92] applied
anomaly detection techniques on embeddings produced
from static tainting to discover missing conditions such as
input validation. Perl et al. [93] used commit messages to de-
tect the vulnerabilities of a program. These work leveraged
Support Vector Machine (SVM) for VP. Li et al. [94] used
multi-class SVM to detect different class of vulnerabilities.
Recently, DLVP has been subject to much research in both
static- [8] and dynamic [95]-analysis scenario. However,
static settings are more popular [96] using code slices [6],
[7], trees [97], graphs [12] etc. Although most prominent
approaches [6]–[8], [76] use token based representation of
code, recent graph based modeling showed success in vul-
nerability prediction [12].
Code Property Graph (CPG), introduced by Yam-
aguchi et al. [16], models the combined semantic and syn-
tactic information of a program. The CPG is a joint data
structure that leverages the information from abstract syntax
trees, control flow graphs and program dependency graphs.
CPG has shown to be robust in reasoning about vulnera-
bilities [12], [16], [98]. Thus, REVEAL uses CPG to extract
graph based features. In addition, REVEAL reduces data
imbalance bias (through re-sampling in feature space) and
learns to maximize separation between vulnerable and non-
vulnerable examples.
There are several choices of techniques for reducing data
imbalance [47], [49], [99], all of which use different strategies
for balancing any imbalanced datasets. We choose SMOTE
in REVEAL’s pipeline as it has shown to be successful in
other software engineering related tasks [51], [100]–[103].
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we systematically study different aspects of
Deep Learning based Vulnerability Detection to effectively
find real world vulnerabilities. We empirically show dif-
ferent shortcomings of existing datasets and models that
potentially limits the usability of those techniques in prac-
tice. Our investigation found that existing datasets are too
simple to represent real world vulnerabilities and existing
modeling techniques do not completely address code se-
mantics and data imbalance in vulnerability detection. Fol-
lowing these empirical findings, we propose a framework
for collecting real world vulnerability dataset. We propose
REVEAL as a configurable vulnerability prediction tool that
addresses the concerns we discovered in existing systems
and demonstrate its potential towards a better vulnerability
prediction tool.
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